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Abstract
We present a Model Driven Development (MDD) approach to the development of access control
policies for distributed systems. The models are expressed as Meta-Object Facility (MOF) models
enriched by Uniﬁed Modeling Language (UML) proﬁles. The view-based access control model is
used as an example, for which we present a platform independent meta-model and platform speciﬁc
meta-models for the Java 2 Platform, Enterprise Edition (J2EE). A management application is
used to build instance models for the platform independent and platform speciﬁc meta-models,
respectively.
We present in this paper how the platform independent models can be used to generate the platform
speciﬁc models, and how the meta-models can be used to generate the models for the speciﬁc
application. Finally, the platform speciﬁc models are used to generate the security policy to be
deployed in the security infrastructure.
We show how consistence requirements can be veriﬁed formally by using category-based graph
transformations.
Keywords: MDA, MDD, UML, CORBA, J2EE, Security
1 Introduction
Security aspects are inherent in any modern software system that is not used
in completely trusted environments. In the software development process, on
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the other hand, security is not yet suﬃciently supported. The lack of a sys-
tematic support for software engineers who need to produce secure software is
based on the fact, that security requirements are generally diﬃcult to analyze
and model [9,5] and because security policies are generally speciﬁed in terms
of highly specialized security models that are not integrated with general soft-
ware engineering models. Recent research concerns the integration of security
engineering into the software development process [7,8].
We present in this paper a Model Driven Development (MDD)[9] approach
to the development of access control policies for distributed systems. A model
driven approach has the advantage that the many speciﬁcation documents
developed in the software development process are related and that existing
dependencies are documented. A documentation of dependencies helps to
take into account every change of a model or a relation necessary to guarantee
consistency. Moreover, the model driven approach is a promising basis to
build tools to ensure consistency of models even if they are changed often due
to uncertain requirements on which they depend.
In the presented approach, models are expressed as Meta-Object Facil-
ity (MOF) [12] models enriched by Uniﬁed Modeling Language (UML)[11]
proﬁles[12]. MOF is the standard meta language deﬁned by the OMG in
which other modeling languages can be speciﬁed. The advantage of the MOF
approach is to make the deﬁnition of (meta)-models independent of the con-
crete application domain of the models and to provide a concise and unique
set of concepts for the deﬁnition of meta-models. Moreover, multiple meta-
models can be managed by the MOF and relations between meta-models can
be utilized as a basis for a transformation of models. We combine the MOF
models with UML proﬁles concerning a speciﬁc platform or a speciﬁc applica-
tion domain to get a usable and readable notation of MOF models.
In our approach, an access control model is speciﬁed by a platform and
application domain independent MOF meta-model. This meta-model can be
instantiated in an application domain, i.e., it speciﬁes then a model for an
access control policy speciﬁc for an application. Additionally, the meta-model
can be reﬁned to a platform speciﬁc MOF meta-model (e.g., CORBA[10],
J2EE[16], SOAP[18]). Combining both, application domain instantiation and
platform speciﬁc reﬁnement, results in a speciﬁc application model having a
customized application access control policy that is implemented in a speciﬁc
platform.
In this paper, we use View-based Access Control (VBAC)[4], an extension
of Role-based Access Control (RBAC)[14] to distributed object systems, as
example access control model. A conference management system serves as
application domain and J2EE as speciﬁc target platform on which the confer-
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ence management application is implemented.
One advantage of the model driven approach is the speciﬁc documentation
of the model relations. Beside the maintenance of the consistency between
models, these mappings can be used to check constraints in instance and
reﬁned models, respectively. We present the speciﬁcation of speciﬁc VBAC
constraints by Object Constraint Language (OCL)[12] constraints added to
the application independent meta-model that must be satisﬁed in the instance
models for speciﬁc applications, too.
The remainder of this article is organized as follows: We introduce the
access control model which supports our concepts by an example in Section 2.
Section 3 concerns the meta-models (platform independent and EJB speciﬁc)
for the VBAC access control model, Section 4 presents the instance models for
a conference management application. The formal consistency of the model
reﬁnements by graph transformations is treated in Section 5. Section 6 com-
pares our paper to related work. Finally, Section 7 concludes the paper and
points to future work.
2 View based Access Control
View-based access control is an access control model speciﬁcally designed
to support the design and management of access control policies in object-
oriented systems [4,2]. The principal feature of VBAC is that of a view for
the description of ﬁne-grained access rights, which are permissions or denials
for operations of distributed objects. Views on objects are assigned to prin-
cipals, i.e., to individual subjects or roles, and a principal has access to an
operation of an object if (s)he has a view on the object with a permission to
call the operation. The principal has no access if the operation is explicitly
denied in another view on that object that is available to the role, or if no
permission is found.
For deﬁning views, we use the View Policy Language (VPL)[4] as part
of a policy design document, which is a product of the design stage in the
development process. In addition to the usual features described above, VPL
also supports view extension, so that an extending view inherits all access
rights of the base view. Views can statically be restricted such that they
can only be assigned to speciﬁc roles and views can be declared to be virtual.
Virtual views have empty bodies. To specify automatic changes in the security
state, VPL deﬁnes schemas. A schema deﬁnes triggers for the automatic
assignment and removal of views to principals.
View-based access policies are delivered in descriptor ﬁles and deployed
together with applications in the target environments, similar to approaches
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like EJB [16] or the CORBA Component Model [10].
3 The VBAC-MDA approach
This section gives an overview of our model driven approach to develop a
VPL policy descriptor for a speciﬁc application running on a speciﬁc platform.
Figure 1 depicts the general idea. As ﬁrst step for designing the access control
policies for an application, the system designer creates a platform independent
model for the VBAC-model. We denote this model in the sequel by VBAC-
PIM (VBAC Platform Independent Model).
<<MOF>>
VBAC PIM
Metamodel
VBAC PIM
Model
<<MOF>>
Metamodel
VBAC PSM
<<MOF>>
Model
VBAC PSM
<<MOF>>
System Designer
Compiler
Developer
Infrastructure
<<instantiate>>
<<instantiate>>
<<refine>> <<mapped to>>
<<edit>>
<<edit>>
<<deployed to>>
Fig. 1. MDA VBAC models.
After the system speciﬁcation phase, the development group chooses the
technologies for their implementation. The platform independent models are
mapped to platform speciﬁc models for the chosen platforms. To map the
models related to access control, the VBAC-PIM is compiled to a VBAC-
PSM (VBAC Platform Specifc Model). We will show later how this is done
for the EJB platform.
This automatically generated VBAC-PSM is not complete. Technological
parameters, such as name servers or proxy settings, cannot be read out of
the VBAC-PIM. A developer has to add these missing parts. Finally the
VBAC-PSM is used to generate a VPL deployment ﬁle, which subsequently is
enforced by the speciﬁc security infrastructure (called Raccoon). In the next
sections we describe the models and their mappings in more detail.
3.1 VBAC-PIM Meta-model
The VBAC-PIM Meta-model (VBAC-PIM-MM) speciﬁes the elements pro-
vided by VBAC. Since VBAC is developed for distributed object systems, the
VBAC-PIM-MM is intended for a platform based on objects (e.g., CORBA).
Figure 2 shows the MOF model for the VBCA-PIM-MM. The model contains
mainly roles, views and schemas. The role attributes minCard and maxCard
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deﬁne the minimal and maximal number of principals that must/can play a
role. Roles can be ordered in a hierarchy (extends-association), may exclude
each other, i.e., one principal cannot play two (or more) roles in mutual exclu-
sion relation at the same time, and may require other roles as a prerequisite.
Roles may be assigned to several principals and principals may play several
roles at the same time.
Right
PermissionSet DenialSet
View
+virtual:boolean
UML::Interfaces::Interface
SchemaExpression
RemoveExpression
AssignExpression
Role
+maxCard:int
+minCard:int
UML::Core::Operation
shortcut
Ressource
Principal
RessourceSpecifier
−type:{this,result}
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*
*
*
*
1
1
1
1
*
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*
*
1
*
*
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1
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to
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isRequired
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Fig. 2. The MOF model for the VBAC-PIM meta-model.
Roles as well as principals may hold several views. A view consists of
a (possibly empty) permission set and a (possibly empty) denial set. Both
sets contain rights to call operations of an interface. The association controls
speciﬁes the interface to which the operations of the view belong. A view
may require other views, i.e., a view can be assigned to a role or principal
not before the required views are assigned. Also views can be ordered in a
hierarchy, where the extended view has the denial and permissions sets of the
base view. A virtual view is a view without permissions.
The Operation as well as the Interface in the VBAC-PIM-MM are model
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elements imported from UML. The association between the UML operation
and the UML interface is an abbreviation for the navigation path given in the
UML speciﬁcation.
A Schema consists of several expressions. An expression can be either
an AssignExpression used to assign a view to a role or a principal or a Re-
moveExpression to remove a view from a role or a principal. An expression is
always related to one view (the one that shall be assigned or removed), to one
role or principal, and to one Interface or RessourceSpeciﬁer. One expression,
however, cannot be related to both an Interface and RessourceSpeciﬁer.
A resource is an object implementing an interface. A RessourceSpeciﬁer
speciﬁes such an object as a place holder. A resource speciﬁer has the possible
types self (the object on which the operation is called) and result (the result
object - if any - of the called operation).
3.1.1 VBAC-PIM-MM Constraint Model
This section works out the consistence requirements for the VBAC model.
These requirements must be satisﬁed by any instance model of the VBAC-
PIM-MM and subsequently any VBAC-PSM-MM. We formulate the require-
ments ﬁrstly informally and give afterwards a speciﬁcation in OCL.
The consistence requirements for roles are as follows.
• The value for attribute maxCard must always be greater than the value for
minCard.
context Role inv:
self.maxCard >= self.minCard
Following requirements are consistency requirements for views.
• A virtual view must not deﬁne permissions nor denials.
context View inv:
(self.virtual = true) implies
(self.permissionSet->isEmpty() and
self.denialSet->isEmpty())
• A view cannot contain the same right in both the permission and the denial
set.
context View inv:
self.permissionSet.right->
intersection(self.denialSet.right)
->isEmpty()
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3.2 VBAC–EJB Meta-model
If we choose EJB as speciﬁc platform, in a ﬁrst approach, one could rep-
resent every object of the VBAC-PIM meta-model by an EJB entity bean.
Then, the mapping from VBAC-PIM-MM to EJB is straight-forward: every
interface in the VBAC-PIM meta-model is represented by an EJB remote in-
terface of an entity bean and every object by an entity bean. The VBAC-EJB
meta-model is given by the MOF model in Figure 3 where the model element
EJBRemoteInterface is used instead of Interface, EntityBean instead of
Resource, and EJBPrincipal instead of Principal.
VBAC EJB metamodel
UML::Interfaces::Interface
EJBRemoteInterface
Ressource
EntityBean
Principal
EJBPrincipal
VBAC PIM metamodel
Fig. 3. The mapping from a PIM-VBAC model to a EJB meta-model
Thus, the mapping from the VBAC-PIM meta-model to the VBAC-EJB
meta-model is the identity function with the three exceptions shown in Fig-
ure 3: The VBAC-PIM meta-model Interface is mapped to the EJBRemoteIn-
terface, the VBAC-PIM meta-model Resource is mapped to EntityBean, and
the VBAC-PIM meta-model Principal to EJBPrincipal.
But this approach for an EJB implementation has the disadvantage that it
blurs the distinction between application logic and data access. Thus, a better
approach is to use the entity beans for the data access operations and use
stateless session beans to implement the main system operations as application
logic [15]. This has the additional advantage that these session beans can easily
be used from a SOAP middleware [15]. This simpliﬁes the implementation of
distributed clients which provide the graphical interfaces for the users.
The disadvantage of this approach is that stateless session beans are built
upon a module-based paradigm instead of an object-oriented one. To illustrate
this problem, consider a document management system providing a document
factory operation:
Document createDocument()
If the operation createDocument() is implemented with stateless EJB
session beans, a factory approach based on object references is not feasible.
This is due to the fact that the return value of the method must not be a
remote reference to an entity bean. Otherwise the client would have direct
access to the database layer. Furthermore, the integration of entity beans
T. Fink et al. / Electronic Notes in Theoretical Computer Science 142 (2006) 161–179 167
in a SOAP midddleware is signiﬁcantly more diﬃcult than the integration of
session beans.
This conﬂict between the object-oriented VBAC-PIM-MM and a modular
platform speciﬁc model is no problem for static security policies. This is
because these are only speciﬁed on interfaces in general and not on concrete
objects. The VBAC-PIM-MM, however, uses schemas to describe dynamic
policies in which rights are dynamically assigned and removed to single object
instances. In the case of stateless session beans, this unique assignment of
rights is not possible anymore.
Instead of an object reference the methods of session beans use identiﬁers
of primitive data types to reference internal application entities. For example,
the factory method for documents in a session bean could be:
int createDocument()
The return value is a number that identiﬁes the document and can be used
for an update method such as:
void updateDocument(int document, String newText)
This integer value which is used to reference the created object cannot
be automatically controlled by the runtime system. For a clean separation
between application logic and the access control policies we need to extend the
VBAC policy model by an additional mechanism to store these relationships
between identiﬁers for objects created by the factory method and the caller of
the factory. We add relational tables that can be manipulated by the runtime
system. In our example we use a binary relation Author of type [Principal,
int] between principals and identiﬁers.
The relation is updated if the factory method is called and the new docu-
ment is created. We specify the modiﬁcation of the relation Author in schemas,
since they model the consequences of operation calls on the protection state.
In our example, if the operation createDocument() is called, the pair
(caller, result) is added to Author. The keyword caller denotes the
principal which calls the operation, the keyword result is the returned value
of the operation. It is also possible to remove pairs from Author if documents
are deleted.
schema DocumentFactorySchema observes DocumentFactory
{
int createDocument()-> add(caller,result) to Author;
void deleteDocument(int doc)-> remove(caller,doc) from Author;
...
}
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If the access control policy requires that only the owner of a document
has access to a document, this is speciﬁed, as well as all other access control
requirements, in a view. The following example speciﬁes that only the owner of
a document can update the document. The if-condition restricts the possible
parameters to documents of the caller, i.e., a call is permitted if there is a
corresponding pair (caller, document) in the relation Author for the document
the caller intends to update.
view DocumentView controls DocumentManagement
{
void updateDocument(int document,
String newText)
if (caller,document) in Author;
...
}
Due to these considerations, the VBAC-EJB meta-model in Figure 4 is
more complex than the one in which objects are mapped to entity beans (see
Figure 3).
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+add(p:Principal,v:Integer):void
+delete(p:Principal,v:Integer):void
AuthorEntry
RemoveExpression
AssignExpression
EJBRemoteInterface
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PermissionSet DenialSet
Right
1
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1
1
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1
1
1
1
1
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1
Fig. 4. The MOF model for the VBAC-EJB Meta-model.
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4 A Conference Management System
The previous section presented the platform independent VBAC meta-model
and its reﬁnement to EJB meta-models. This section instantiates the meta-
models in an application domain in which VBAC is used to control access.
The application example is a conference management system originally
introduced in [4,2]. Using the conference application, a PC chair can open
a submission phase for a conference, so that authors may submit papers.
The chair is responsible for the declaration of the submission deadline, which
terminates the submission phase and starts the reviewing phase. Reviewers
write and submit reviews for their assigned papers. The reviewing phase is
terminated by the chair calling for a ﬁnal decision.
We start in the design stage of the software development process in which
the interfaces are already available. The requirements analysis and the inte-
gration of access control requirements into the functional requirements of the
conference application in the UML development process is given in [3].
4.1 VBAC-PIM Conference Model
The MOF-model for the conference application in Figure 5 is an instance of the
VBAC-PIM meta-model in Figure 2. We use a UML proﬁle for a convenient
presentation of the MOF-Model. The UML proﬁle consists of the following
stereotypes:
• <<view>>: Attached to a model element in the MOF model which is an
instance of a view in the PIM-Metamodel.
• <<virtual view>>: Instance of a View in the PIM-MM in which the at-
tribute virtual is true.
• <<role>>: Instance of a Role in the PIM-MM.
• <<schema>>: Instance of a Schema in the PIM-MM.
• <<assign>>: Instance of an AssignExpression in the PIM-MM.
• <<remove>>: Instance of a RemoveExpression in the PIM-MM.
The UML proﬁle is not necessary for the speciﬁcation of the VBAC-PIM
model, but it makes it easier to present the relation between the VBAC-
PIM model and the VBAC-PIM meta-model. The VBAC-PIM model as an
instance of the VBAC-PIM meta-model is still platform independent.
Figure 5 (for interfaces, roles, views, etc.), ﬁg. 6 and ﬁg. 7 (for the schemas)
show the VBAC-PIM model for the conference application.
The roles (speciﬁed by stereotype <<role>>) are Author, Reviewer and
Chair which extends Reviewer. The roles Author and Chair exclude each
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<< interface >>
ConferenceManagement
+beginSubmission():void
+deadlineReached():void
+makeDecision():void
<< interface >>
SubmissionManagement
+registerPaper(String author_name:String author_name,String title:String title):Paper
<< interface >>
Paper
+submit():void
+submitReview(review:String):Review
+read():String
+write(text:String):void
<< role >>
Author
<< role >>
Reviewer
<< role >>
Chair
maxcard = 1
<< virtual view >>
SubmissionPhase
<< view >>
Registering
+registerPaper():
<< view >>
PaperReviewing
+submitReview():
for views:
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<< view >>
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+beginSubmission():
+deadlineReached():
+makeDecision():<< view >>
Reading
+read():Operation
<< virtual view >>
ReviewingPhase
<< view >>
NoMorePaperReviewing
−submitReview():Operation
<< view >>
PaperSubmitting
+submit():Operation
<< view >>
Modifying
+write():Operation
<< interface >>
Review
+read():String
+write(text:String):void
+getReviewer():String
<< view >>
ReviewModifying
+read():Operation
+write():Operation
+getReviewer():Operation
1
1
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1
1
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1
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Fig. 5. The MOF model for the PIM Konferenz.
other to prevent a chair of submitting a paper to its own conference. The role
Chair has a cardinality constraint for the attribute maxcard (see VBAC-PIM
meta-model) that requires at most one principal assigned to this role. If not
explicitly speciﬁed, the role cardinality attributes mincard and maxcard are
set to zero resp. to an unbounded number, i.e., there is no restriction on the
number of principals assigned to a role. For example, there can be as many
principals in role Author as needed, but no principal at all in role Author is
possible as well.
Views are speciﬁed by the stereotypes <<view>> and <<virtual view>>,
respectively. Views list the operations to which they permit or deny access.
The preﬁx + speciﬁes a permission, the preﬁx - a denial. In the example,
all views but NoMorePaperReviewing (which deﬁnes a denial to call operation
submitRebiew()) deﬁne permissions. The views ReviewingPhase and Submis-
sionPhase are virtual views which have, by deﬁnition, an empty body. Due to
the lack of operations, they are not related to an interface. In the example,
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they are used to distinguish between the submission, reviewing and decision
phase of the conference process.
Schemas are modeled in the diagrams ﬁg. 6 and ﬁg. 7, each for a single in-
terface. The diagram in Figure 6 concerns interface ConferenceManagement.
A model element with stereotype <<schema>> speciﬁes the schema name and
there is an association to the interface for which the schema is responsible. A
ConferenceManagement
(from VPL−PIM−Conference)
<< schema >>
Steering
<< assign >>
beginSubmission
<< remove >>
deadlineReached
<< assign >>
deadlineReached
<< remove >>
makeDecision
SubmissionPhase
(from VPL−PIM−Conference)
ReviewingPhase
(from VPL−PIM−Conference)
Author
(from VPL−PIM−Conference)
Reviewer
(from VPL−PIM−Conference)
SubmissionPhase
(from VPL−PIM−Conference)
Author
(from VPL−PIM−Conference)
ReviewingPhase
(from VPL−PIM−Conference)
Reviewer
(from VPL−PIM−Conference)
1
1
observes
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1 1
to
1
1
1 1to
1
1
1 1from
1
1
1 1from
1
1
Fig. 6. The MOF model for the PIM Konferenz Schema ConferenceManagement.
model element with stereotype <<assign>> and name opName speciﬁes the
assignment of the connected view to the connected principal or role when the
operation with the name opName is executed. For example, the <<assign>>
model element beginSubmission speciﬁes the assignment of the virtual view
SubmissionPhase to the role Author. After this operation is called the sub-
mission phase is opened and all members of role Author can submit papers.
Analog, a model element with stereotype <<remove>> and name opName spec-
iﬁes the removal of the connected view from the connected principal or role
when the operation with the name opName is executed. For example, the
virtual view SubmissionPhase is removed from role Author when operation
deadlineReached() is called. Afterwards, authors cannot submit papers any-
more.
Figure 7 models the schema for the interface SubmissionManagement.
Whereas the schema Steering assigns and removes only virtual views, schema
Submission assigns non-virtual views. Non-virtual views list rights belonging
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to a unique interface. Such a view can be valid for a complete interface, i.e.,
on all objects of this interface holds the view, or on a single object instance.
SubmissionManagement
(from VPL−PIM−Conference)
<< schema >>
Submission
<< assign >>
registerPaper
PaperSubmitting
(from VPL−PIM−Conference) result caller
Modifying
(from VPL−PIM−Conference)
1 1
1
1 1
1
1 1
on
1 1to
1
1
Fig. 7. The MOF model for the PIM Conference Schema SubmissionManagement.
There is an additional schema for interface Paper (not shown in this pa-
per). When the operation submit() is called on a Paper object p, the view
PaperReading on p is assigned to role Reviewer and the view Modifying on p is
removed from the caller of the operation (the author who submitted the pa-
per). When the operation submitReview() is called on p, the view NoMorePa-
perReviewing on p is assigned to the caller (i.e., the reviewer who submitted a
review for p cannot submit another review for p, but other reviewers still can
submit reviews). The view ReviewModifying on the review object r for paper
p is assigned to role Reviewer.
4.1.1 Consistence Checking of the PIM–Model
The PIM meta-model may have consistency requirements as shown in Sub-
section 3.1.1 in the case of the VBAC–PIM meta-model. These consistence
requirements must be satisﬁed by all instances of the meta-model, as well.
We say a MOF-Model M is a consistent instance of a PIM-Meta-model with a
set of OCL constraints C, if the model M satisﬁes all constraints in C. OCL
constraints can be automatically checked with respect to a model using an
OCL constraint checker, e.g., the OCL checker USE [12].
4.2 VBAC–EJB Model
Based on the VBAC-PIM model, a compiler can generate parts of the VBAC-
EJB models (not further explained in this article). Technological parameters,
such as name servers or proxy settings, cannot be read out of the VBAC-PIM
model. A developer must add these missing parts. The EJB speciﬁc compiler
generates for each interface in the VBAC-PIM model an EJB remote interface.
For example, for interface Paper an IDL interface is generated which has the
operations speciﬁed in the VBAC-PIM model.
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5 Formal consistency checking
This section concerns the consistency of the model development, i.e., the ques-
tion whether a reﬁned model satisﬁes all the constraints of its base model. For
example, does the VBAC-PIM-model satisfy the constraints of the VBAC-PIM
meta-model? We present formal concepts based on graph transformations to
decide this question. We brieﬂy introduce graph transformations in the next
subsection as far as necessary for the remainder of this article. For the gen-
eral concepts of graphs, graph rules, types and attribution in the algebraic
approaches, see [13].
5.1 Background on Graph Transformations
We consider directed, typed and attributed graphs. For the description of
attributes a simple algebraic approach is used in this article. A graph mor-
phism f : G→ H between two graphs G and H is a partial mapping between
the nodes (resp. edges) of G and the nodes (resp. edges) of H so that 1) f
respects the graph structure, i.e. whenever the mapping for edges is deﬁned
for an edge e, the mapping for the source node s and the target node t of e is
deﬁned and f(s) and f(t) are the source and target node for the edge f(e) in
H, 2) nodes and edges are mapped only to nodes and edges of the same type,
and 3) f respects the attribution, i.e., attributes are in a previously deﬁned
relation (what is deﬁned in the algebraic speciﬁcation of the attribute type).
We call the graph morphism total if the mappings between the node and edge
sets are total. A graph morphism is injective if the underlying mappings for
nodes and edges are injective.
A graph rule r is an injective graph morphism r : L → R in which the
attributes of image and domain nodes/edges coincide. The graph L, called the
left-hand side of the graph rule, describes the elements a graph must contain
for r to be applicable. The partial morphism is undeﬁned on nodes/edges that
are intended to be deleted, deﬁned on nodes/edges that are intended to be
preserved. Nodes and edges of R, right-hand side, without a pre-image are
newly created. The application of a rule r : L → R to a graph G requires a
total morphism m : L→ G, called match, from the left-hand side of the rule to
G. The application itself is formally characterized by the pushout of the rule
morphism and the match in the category of graphs and graph morphisms.
The construction of the derived graph consists of two steps: ﬁrst delete all
objects in G that have a pre-image in L \ dom(r), then add all graph objects
of R \ r(L) to G connected to the nodes m(dom(r)). If the label or attribute
value of the left-hand side is a variable, it is substituted with the label or
attribute value of the mapped graph object.
T. Fink et al. / Electronic Notes in Theoretical Computer Science 142 (2006) 161–179174
5.2 MOF models as Graphs
A MOF model can be seen as a graph [17]. Each MOF model element with
name e is translated to a node of type e. The attributes and operations of the
MOF model element are represented as sets of tuples in the node attributes
attributeList and operationList, respectively. Associations ass of the MOF
model are represented as edges of type ass. Figure 8 is an example, where a)
shows the MOF model elements Role and View together with the association
restricted to of the VBAC PIM meta-model and b) its representation as a
graph.
operationList=()
View
virtual:boolean
instance name=x
attributeList=((macCard,int,x),
(minCard,int,y))
operationList=()
Role
a)
restricted_to
maxCard:int
minCard:int
Role
b)
restricted_to instance name=x’
attributeList=((virtual,boolean,z))
View
Fig. 8. MOF as graph.
5.3 MOF instance mappings as Graph Rules
MOF models are related by mappings. In previous sections, we have deﬁned
these mappings for the VBAC model. For each MOF Model M , we present
next graph rules to construct MOF models M ′ which are instances of M . The
instance mapping from M ′ to M is derived from the construction of M ′.
A MOF model M deﬁnes the following set of graph rules: For each model
element with name element in M there is an instance rule create element as
shown in Figure 9. This graph rule creates new instances of the model element.
For each association with name ass in M there is a graph rule create ass which
creates a new edge between the required instances (see Figure 9). Figure 9 at
the bottom shows the example for the VBAC-PIM meta-model element Role
and the association excludes.
The graph rules derived from a MOF model M can be used to construct
MOF models M ′ (starting from an empty graph). The mapping between
m : M ′ →M is a graph morphism deﬁned as follows: a node of type Element
(e.g., Role) is mapped to the model element Role in M . Analog, an edge ass
in M ′ is mapped to the association ass in M . For example, the MOF model
in Figure 5 can be constructed by the graph rules deﬁned by the VBAC-PIM
meta-model in Figure 2 (if we assume a plain MOF model without UML proﬁle
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ass
create role
instance name=n
attributeList=((maxCard,x),
(minCard,y))
operationList=()
Role
instance name=n’
attributeList=y’
operationList=z’
Role
instance name=n
attributeList=y
operationList=z
Role
instance name=n’
attributeList=y’
operationList=z’
Role
instance name=n
attributeList=y
operationList=z
Role
excludes
create
excludes
instance name=x
attributeList=y
operationList=z
elementName
instance name=x’
attributeList=y’
operationList=z’
elementName’
instance name=x
attributeList=y
operationList=z
elementName
instance name=x’
attributeList=y’
operationList=z’
elementName’
create Element
instance name=x
attributeList=y
operationList=z
Element
create ass
Fig. 9. Graph rules to build an instance model.
notation).
5.4 Veriﬁcation
We present how to formally ensure that the mapping i : M ′ → M between
a MOF model M ′ constructed by the graph rules derived from MOF model
M (as explained in the previous subsection) preserves the satisfaction of the
constraints of M in M ′. The formal check is based on a construction originally
introduced in [6]. Since we need for an analysis a formal semantics of the MOF
model constraints, we express them by graphical constraints. In [1] is shown
how to translate OCL constraints into graphical constraints. An automatic
translation is only possible for a subset of OCL constraints, the remaining
constraints must be speciﬁed by hand.
A graphical constraint is a total graph morphism c : X → Y and a graph
G satisﬁes c if for all total graph morphisms p : X → G there does not exist
a total and injective graph morphism q : Y → G so that X c→ Y q→ G =
X
p→ G. Examples of graphical constraints for some of the OCL constraints
for views in Section 3.1.1 are given in Figure 10. In the Figure, we omitted the
attributes of nodes if not necessary for the constraint. Graphical constraint a)
speciﬁes that a virtual view has no rights, and b) speciﬁes that a view cannot
have a right in both the permission and the denial set.
To ensure the consistency, we apply the construction in [6]. This construc-
tion gets as input a graph rule and a graphical constraint and checks if the
graph rule may construct a graph which does not satisfy the constraint. If
this is the case, the construction modiﬁes the graph rule in such a way that
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attributeList((virtual,boolean,true))
View
attributeList((virtual,boolean,true))
View
View
PermissionSet
DenialSet
Right
View
negative
PermissionSet
a)
b)
negative
Fig. 10. Graph Constraints.
the rule never constructs a graph which does not satisfy the constraint. If we
apply the construction to all rules derived from a MOF model M and to all
graphical constraints of M , we ensure that each MOF Model M ′ constructed
by the modiﬁed rules satisﬁes the constraints of M . Therefore, we are sure
that the mapping m : M ′ →M preserves consistency.
6 Related Work
An approach closely related to ours is SecureUML [8]. SecureUML is a UML-
based modeling language for the model-driven development of secure systems.
It provides support for specifying constraints, as well. The security informa-
tion integrated in the UML models is used to generate access control infras-
tructures. In contrast to our approach, SecureUML focuses on static design
models which are closely related to implementations. Therefore, there is no
support for detecting security requirements (e.g., which roles are needed and
which permissions they need). Unlike our approach, which is suitable for
arbitrary access control models, SecureUML builds on RBAC. Moreover, Se-
cureUML does not have a formal semantics to verify security properties.
7 Conclusions and Future Work
We presented an MDA driven approach for the speciﬁcation of access con-
trol. We have shown how an access control model can be modeled platform
and application independent and how application and platform information
is added by mappings between the models. The formal consideration of the-
ses mappings by graph transformations enables us to prove the preservation
of access control constraints along these mappings. Our approach oﬀers a
good separation of security policies and application logic for object-oriented
systems.
Unfortunately this approach does not work well with module-based sys-
tem, e.g., systems based on SOAP [18]. The main reason is that the main
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entities in the application are not exposed as object references with well de-
ﬁned interfaces. Instead they are referenced by parameters in the module
operations.
As future work we plan to implement a compiler for the generation of
platform and application speciﬁc models from a given PIM. Furthermore, our
aim is the generation of the security speciﬁcation needed for the deployment
of the security enforcement infrastructure. This eases the security adminis-
tration pains, since no special security administration tools and knowledge is
necessary, due to the fact that most of the information can be automatically
generated from the MOF models.
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